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Résumé / Abstract
Cet article examine le lien entre les méthodes de rémunération, incluant
les bonus et le métayage, et le niveau ainsi que la variance des revenus de travail.
Les données utilisées proviennent du National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
(1988-1990). Les résultats indiquent que les travailleurs payés à l’unité gagnent en
moyenne davantage que les autres travailleurs, et ce résultat est robuste à
l’estimation des premières différences. Par ailleurs, l’estimation d’un modèle simple
représentant la structure de covariance des salaires montre que la majorité de la
dispersion des salaires pour les travailleurs payés à l’unité est attribuable à la
productivité non-observée de ces travailleurs.  
In this paper, I investigate the relationship between methods of pay,
including piece rates and bonuses, and the level and variance of wages using
longitudinal data from the NLSY (1988-1990). Results using OLS and fixed-
effects show that piece rate workers earn a premium compared to other workers
while the positive effect of bonuses measured with OLS disappears when I use
fixed-effects. Also, it is shown that the effect of piece rates is negatively related
to the level of tenure, which suggests that rates may be cut as workers
accumulate seniority. Finally, using minimum distance procedures to estimate
a covariance model of wages, I am able to show that most of the variance for
piece rate workers can be attributed to unobserved worker productivity, which
is not the case for workers having pay for performance schemes.
Mots Clés : Méthodes de rémunération, niveau et dispersion des salaires
Keywords : Methods of pay, wage level, wage dispersion
JEL : J33
1 Introduction
Over the last twenty years or so, a number of theoretical models have
been developed to analyze the employment relationship, especially in
terms of the appropriate way to structure the contracts so as to pro-
vide the correct incentives. Despite the rapid pace at which information
economics has progressed, empirical investigations of the implications
of these models (let alone direct testing of the models themselves) have
been rather rare. The obvious reason for this state of aair is the lack
of data. Recently though, a few empirical studies have emerged that
use either rm-level data (see Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom, 1994a,b) or
across-rms data on a subset of the labor force such as executive ocers
(e.g. Gibbons, Murphy, 1992) . To the best of this author's knowledge,
only Ewing (1996), Brown (1990, 1992) and Seiler (1984) have used large
data sets that are more representative of the labor force. Ewing uses one
wave of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth to study the use and
wage impact of pay-for-performance schemes while Brown and Seiler
make use of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics' Industry Wage Surveys
to look at this issue. Case studies are no doubt a very valuable source
of information for examining questions pertaining to so-called internal
labor markets (Doeringer and Piore 1971). But, due to the nature of the
data, such studies have to abstract from market forces. On the other
hand, the data on CEO's usually contains a fair amount of detail allow-
ing the study of incentive models whose empirical implications could not
really be tested using survey-type data sets. The drawback, though, is
that top management workers are but a small fraction of the labor force.
In this paper, I make use of three straight waves from the National Lon-
gitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) for the years 1988 to 1990. Over that
three year period, workers were asked if part of their labor earnings were
based on job performance. They were also asked what form of incentive
schemes was used by their employer. Thus, at the rst level, we can
examine the extent to which incentive pay is used in a relatively repre-
sentative sample of young workers. It is generally believed that pay for
performance schemes are seldom used, at least compared to promotions
(e.g. see Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988))
1
. However, the data show
that a non negligible fraction of workers earn at least part of their labor
income through bonuses and/or piece rates.
The objective in this paper is to examine the impact of being paid
1
Note that l am using the term \pay-for-performance" to refer to the method of
pay (i.e.piece rate or bonus). The label is somewhat of a misnomer in that a contract
specifying a xed salary can provide just as much incentives to the worker to perform
if the threat of employer-initiated separations is eective.
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either a piece rate or a bonus on the wage, controlling for unobserved
worker productivity. Also of interest is the magnitude of the impact
as workers accumulate tenure with their respective employers. Results
using ordinary least-squares show that workers earning part (or all) of
their income due to \explicit incentives" earn on average more than other
workers paid hourly rates or salaries. This results holds for piece rate
workers (but not for bonus workers) even when l use xed-eects. In
addition, the impact of being paid a piece rate is shown to be a nega-
tive function of tenure, while such an eect is non-existent for workers
paid bonuses. This result is consistent with workers having their rates
cut by the employers, although a selection eect by which good piece
rate workers leave early in the employment relationship would also be
consistent with this result. Finally, having three years of data allows
me to estimate a simple covariance model of wages by type of contract.
The results indicate that, as predicted in Lazear (1986), most of the
unexplained variance of wages for piece rate workers can be attributed
to unobserved worker productivity. The same cannot be said of workers
paid either bonuses or salaries/hourly rates.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews a few
theoretical models which are the most useful in terms of their empirical
implications, given the data at my disposal which I describe in the fol-
lowing section. Then I study the eects of pay-for-performance schemes
on the level and the dispersion of labor earnings by exploiting the longi-
tudinal structure of the data. I conclude in the nal section by pointing
out a few caveats to be kept in mind.
2 Theoretical Considerations
2.1 Relationship between Piece Rates and Earnings
Lazear's (1986) two-period model analyzes the conditions under which
piece rate contracts are preferred to xed salaries. He denes salaried
workers as individual for whom
w = g(E) (1)
where E is some measure of eort (e.g. hours worked). For piece rate
workers,
w = f(q) (2)
where q is output. A crucial assumption in Lazear's model is the exis-
tence of a monitoring cost. Without such an assumption, no xed salary
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jobs would exist. Let C be the monitoring cost, R the piece rate and q
the output. For piece rate jobs, we have
w = Rq   C (3)
and for xed salary jobs,
w = E(q) (4)
It is assumed that people can work in other jobs at w*. If E(q) > w

and there are no piece rate rms, then all workers work at this rm.
But this result is inecient: those for whom q < w* should take the
alternative job. Separating them from the others causes expected output
to increase. If both parties are equally uninformed as to the productivity
of the worker, then separation can be achieved by putting everybody in
the piece rate job for a period of time in order for both parties to learn
q. After they learn q, those with Rq > w* stay in the piece rate job.
With asymmetric information, less productive workers select themselves
into the salary jobs. The rms know that they have attracted low ability
workers and they pay accordingly. Thus, the mean earnings of piece rate
workers should be higher than for salaried workers. Pencavel (1977),
Seiler (1984), Brown (1992) and Ewing (1996) each have found evidence
that piece rate workers are paid more than salaried workers. Also, since
pay and productivity are more closely linked in the case of piece rate
contracts, the variance of wages for piece rate workers should be greater
than for other workers. Seiler (1984) found evidence from the Industry
Wage Surveys that the wages of piece rate workers are indeed more
dispersed than is the case for other workers. However, he interprets this
nding as evidence that piece rate workers are paid compensating wage
dierentials for the increased risks they face.
2.2 Intertemporal Strategic Behavior
Piece rates can be negatively related to past output. Realizing this,
workers depress this period's output in order to have a better rate in
the next period (the so-called ratchet eect). Lazear argues that this
strategic behavior can be undone by inating the piece rate in the rst
period. Workers will respond with a higher eort level even though they
anticipate that the employers will cut their rates in the second period.
Thus, if Lazear's story is correct, we should see a stronger eect of piece
rates on earnings early in the employment relationship. This prediction
hinges completely on the assumption that workers can fully commit not
to quit at the end of period one. Employers must be in a position
to exploit some ex post monopsony power. Otherwise, a competitive
3
rm can attract workers whose rates have been decreased. This idea is
formally developed in Kanemoto and MacLeod (1991) where they show
that the existence of outside opportunities can eliminate the ratchet
eect, even when workers incur mobility costs. In the context of a two-
period model, rms compete for a xed number of workers. Competition
among rms thus reduces ex ante prots to zero. A cost C is borne
by the workers each time they take on a job (mobility cost or cost of
retraining). This cost captures the fact that once a worker is in a job,
the rm has some monopsony power over that person. The rm then
tries to exploit this power by lowering rates (or increasing sales targets)
in the second period. Kanemoto and MacLeod show that for suciently
low mobility costs, competition for what they call second-hand workers
can eliminate the ratchet eect. Contrary to Lazear, they do not need
perfect commitment to get ecient piece rate contracts.
Summarizing the dierent predictions stemming from the models just
reviewed, we have: 1) more productive workers will choose piece rate jobs
(Lazear (1986)). In other words, any measured positive relationship be-
tween piece rates and wages is attributed to self-selection on the part of
workers. Thus, using xed eect methods should result in the elimina-
tion of all positive eects; 2) since piece rate schemes gear the worker's
compensation directly to output, the variance of wages should be larger
for piece rate jobs than for salaried jobs and 3) Lazear's model predicts
that the eect of piece rates should be stronger early in the employ-
ment relationship, while Kanemoto and MacLeod predict no such time
decreasing pattern.
3 The Data
The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth data set surveyed 12,686
young males and females who were between the age of 14 and 21 in
1979. In 1988, 1989, and 1990, respondents were asked whether all or
part of their earnings were based on job performance. They were also
asked a few questions on their work environment. For instance, we know
if the respondents were supervising other employees and whether they
had received a promotion since the last interview. Unfortunately, we
do not know the precise dollar amounts of incentive pay received by
workers nor do we know the proportion of their earnings which is due to
pay-for-performance. These represent signicant data limitations which
constrain the interpretation of our results.
The question pertaining to pay-for-performance is the following:
\THE EARNINGS ON SOME JOBS ARE BASED ALL OR IN
4
PART ON HOW A PERSON PERFORMS THE JOB (HAND CARD
D). ON THIS CARD ARE SOME EXAMPLES OF EARNINGS THAT
ARE BASED ON JOB PERFORMANCE. PLEASE TELL ME IF ANY
OF THE EARNINGS ONYOUR JOB (ARE/WERE) BASED ONANY
OF THESE TYPES OF COMPENSATION. PLEASE DO NOT IN-
CLUDE PROFIT SHARING OR EMPLOYEE STOCK PURCHASE
PLANS.
1. PIECE RATES.
2. COMMISSIONS.
3. BONUSES (BASED ON JOB PERFORMANCE).
4. STOCK OPTIONS.
5. TIPS.
6. OTHER."
We should note that it is not possible to tell a priori whether the
bonuses refer to amounts paid at the discretion of the employer when
the latter subjectively considers that the performance of the employee is
worthy of a cash reward, or whether they merely represent another form
of piece rate. In the latter case, the employee gets a reward for achieving
or surpassing some kind of quantitative target which can be objectively
determined.
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Some summary statistics are presented in table 1.
Table 2 shows the total number of observations present in the un-
balanced sample, by occupation and industry aliations (1 digit level).
We restrict the sample to individuals who were in the labor market on a
full-time basis. The people who were considered as meeting that crite-
rion were (i) those whose primary activity was either working full-time,
on a temporary lay-o or looking actively for a job, (ii) those who had
worked at least half the year since the last interview and who were work-
ing at least 20 hours per week. Individuals excluded from the sample
are those who have been in the military at any time, the self-employed
and all public sector employees. These restrictions leave us with 8,165
observations (3,847 workers).
Using the same format, tables 3 and 4 show the number of workers
whose earnings were, at least in part, based explicitly on performance.
Note that all those who declared having been paid by commissions are
lumped together with piece rate workers. There were so few observations
of workers earning tips or part of stock option plans that I simply ig-
nore them henceforth and focus on bonuses and piece rates. Piece rates
and/or bonuses are observed for 21% of the sample (1,732 observations).
Of these, it should be noted that 188 observations represent workers
2
See Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994) and MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) on
the subject of implicit and explicit contracts.
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whose earnings depend on both piece rates and bonuses. In terms of
percentages, both subsamples show that the occurrence of bonuses and
piece rates is particularly concentrated in the manufacturing and whole-
sale and retail trade industries, in line with the proportion of the total
sample coming from these two sectors. However, there seems to be sig-
nicant dierences between the two forms of incentive pay when we look
at the occupations. For the piece rate subsample, nearly 63% of the
workers are either salespersons, operatives or craftsmen. However, these
three occupation categories include less than 35% of the workers paid
bonuses. Bonuses seem to be most common among professional and
technical workers, managers and administrators, and clerical workers.
Of all those being paid bonuses, 54% of the work force is represented
by these three occupational categories. Although it seems reasonable to
think that many of the bonuses paid to managers are in eect another
form of piece rates in which pay is based on the number of units sold or
produced, this conjecture is not so obvious for professionals and clerical
workers. Thus it appears that the bonuses reported in these data are,
to a degree, a dierent form of incentive scheme.
Table 5 shows the same breakdown for the subsample consisting of
workers who received promotions over the sample period. One inter-
esting aspect of that table is its similarity with table 4 in terms of the
occupational patterns.
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A casual glance at tables 4 and 5 suggests that
bonuses based on job performance and promotions are correlated, which
is not the case for piece rates. Given the problem that we have with
the data on promotions, table 6 presents the same breakdown for work-
ers whose responsibilities increased from one interview to the next. This
variable and promotions are very highly correlated in the two years where
the data on promotions seems reliable.
4 Estimation and Results
4.1 Methods of Pay and the Eect of Earnings
Consider the following log-wage equation:
lnw
it
= X
it
 + p
it

1
+ b
it

2
+ 
it
(5)

it
= 
i
+ 
it
3
Although the data on promotions covers the 1988-1990 period, no promotions are
reported in 1990. In fact, all workers's answers to this question are coded as \valid
skips" (i.e. the question is irrelevant). This is hard to believe given that over 1,400
promotions are reported in 1988 and 1989.
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where w represents labor earnings per hour of worker i at time t, X
is a vector of controls
4
, p
it
is equal to one if worker i is paid a piece
rate at time t and b
it
is a similar indicator for the presence of a bonus,

i
represents unobserved worker productivity, and 
it
is an error term
that is independently and identically distributed. Previous studies, such
as Brown (1992), Seiler (1984) and Ewing (1996) have all found that
piece rate workers earn more than either salaried workers or hourly paid
workers. For comparison purposes, I rst estimate equation (5) using
OLS to determine whether the same empirical pattern is present in these
data. It is not clear a priori what sign should be expected for 
2
. If
most of the bonuses paid have more in common with piece rates than
with merit pay, then we should expect a similar eect. If instead these
bonuses are more like merit pay cash rewards, then according to models
such as the one in MacLeod and Malcomson (1989), there is no reason
to expect workers paid bonuses to earn more on average compared to
other workers.
According to Lazear (1986), the empirical regularities found in pre-
vious studies can be attributed to workers selecting the type of contract
they prefer according to their productivity. More able workers will self-
select into piece rate jobs while other workers choose time rate jobs (or
straight salaries). Thus, any measured positive eect of piece rate on
earnings cannot be attributed to an incentive eect. In other words,
switching all time rate workers to piece rate jobs would not cause an in-
crease in productivity (and wages). In terms of equation (5), this means
that p
it
is positively correlated with 
i
. Consequently, if the positive
eect of piece rates on wages is due solely to a selection bias, then es-
timating (5) with xed-eects should result in the estimated 
1
being
close to zero.
5
On the other hand, if piece rates (and bonuses) truly
have an incentive eect, then the measured eects should not disappear
once xed-eects are used.
A second prediction from Lazear's model is that rms adjust rates
upward in the rst period of the employment relationship to provide
sucient incentives for workers to give the rst-best level of eort, even
if the workers know that employers cannot be prevented from behaving
opportunistically in the second period by decreasing the rates once they
know the productivity of their workers. If the bonus measure included in
4
This vector includes the number of years of schooling, labor market experience
and its square, employer tenure and its square, and dummies for gender, race, indus-
try, occupation, region and health status. Also included is a dummy indicator for
increase in responsibilities.
5
In the xed-eects specications, all variables are measured in deviation form
individual means. Thus, the (xed) unobserved individual productivity component

i
drops out of equation (5).
7
the NLSY data is more like another form of piece rate for which workers
get rewarded if they surpass a quantitative target, then this strategic
interaction should also be at work.
6
If, instead, bonuses reported in this
data set are more akin to merit pay, then no such strategic interaction
is at play. Although I do not have the actual rates paid to these workers
and hence cannot directly see whether these rates are high early in the
employment relationship only to be cut later, one can get an idea of
such strategic behavior by interacting the incentive pay dummies with
employer tenure. According to Lazear, if rates are set higher early in the
employment relationship, then the measured eect of being paid a piece
rate (and, possibly, bonuses) should be a negative function of tenure.
We should thus expect a negative sign for the interaction term.
Results are reported in Table 7. Consistent with prior evidence, we
can see in column 1 that OLS estimates indicate that piece rate workers
and bonus workers earn higher average wages compared with workers
paid on hourly basis or paid salaries. Interestingly, once xed-eects
are used, the positive correlation between the use of a piece rate and
wages is basically unaected, while the eect of being paid a bonus van-
ishes completely. These results suggest that piece rates seem to act as
an incentive device while the same cannot be said for bonuses. In the
latter case, the positive impact measured with OLS merely seems to
reect omitted ability variable bias. Thus controlling for unobserved
worker productivity, there is no evidence that workers paid bonuses earn
a premium over those on an hourly or salary pay scheme. This is consis-
tent with MacLeod and Malcomson (1989)'s story of how labor market
conditions aect the form of the contract (i.e. base pay plus a bonus
vs. straight salary) while the total amount paid to workers remains the
same. Of course, one has to keep in mind that this explanation rests on
interpreting the results as evidence that the bonus measure included in
the data is in fact a merit pay scheme.
Turning my attention to the possibility of strategic behavior between
workers paid piece rates and their employers (i.e. the ratchet eect),
columns 3 and 4 of Table 7 show the results of including interaction
terms between tenure and the incentive pay dummies. We can see that
for piece rate workers, the eect of on wages seem to decline with tenure
with the employer. Even with xed-eects, the interaction term is still
signicant at the 10% level.
7
In the case of workers paid bonuses, there is
6
See Oyer (1995) for an analysis of the interaction between incentives and sales
seasonality.
7
Given that the estimated coecient is signicant at the 10% level, one prudent
explanation would be to acknowledge the possibility of some selection eect going
on. More precisely, it is possible that the negative eect of the interaction term
8
no evidence of a negative relationship between tenure and the occurrence
of bonuses, either with OLS or with xed-eects.
4.2 Methods of Pay and Wage Dispersion
The closer link between productivity and pay that is a characteristic
of piece rate contracts should be reected in the fact that most of the
unexplained variance resulting from the estimation of equation (5) can
be attributed to the variance of unobserved worker productivity in the
case of piece rate workers. The rst step to verifying this prediction is to
break the sample into three distinct subsamples according to the method
of pay (piece rate, bonus, others). Then, exploiting again the longitu-
dinal aspect of the data set, I use the log wage observations adjusted
for schooling and labor market experience to estimate a simple model
of the covariance structure of wages for each type of pay methods using
Chamberlain's (1982,1984) minimum distance estimator adapted to un-
balanced data
8
. In other words, the approach used is rst to regress (by
year) the log wage on labor market experience and schooling and then
to use the estimated residuals to compute estimates of the unrestricted
covariance matrix of residuals. I then impose the restrictions implied by
the simple error component structure given in equation (5) to estimate
the parameters of interest and to test the t of the model.
9
Let e
it
be the residual from a rst-stage regression of the log-wage
on schooling and labor market experience, then we have:
e
it
= lnw
it
 X
0
it
b (6)
where X
0
it
is the vector of controls (experience and schooling) and b
is the vector of the estimated parameters. Then a natural estimator of
the covariance between the residuals at time t and at time s is given by
d
t;s
=
1
N
N
X
i=1
e
it
e
is
(7)
estimated with OLS reects in part the fact good workers who perform very well
move to another employer when their current employer attempts to cut their rate.
Outside options for these workers thus prevents the ratchet eect from taking place
(see Kanemoto and MacLeod (1992) on that point).
8
See Abowd and Card (1989) and Farber and Gibbons (1996)for applications of
these techniques.
9
Note that the results are not sensitive to dierent specications of the log wage
equation estimated in the rst step. Various specications including controls for
tenure, occupation and industry were used without altering the basic conclusions.
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where N represents the number of workers.
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A consistent estimator for
the standard error ofd
t;s
is then given by
Std(d
t;s
) =
v
u
u
t
1
N
N
X
i=1
(e
it
e
is
 d
t;s
)
2
(8)
Table 8 shows estimates of the empirical covariance matrices by method
of pay along with their appropriate standard errors and the number of
workers whose residuals were used in the computations. Turning now to
the restrictions imposed by the error component structure suggested by
equation (5), I assume that the observed residual is given by
e
it
= 
i
+ 
it
(9)
Therefore, the variance of the observed residuals at period t is
var(e
it
) = E(
i
)
2
+E(
it
)
2
= 
2

+ 
2

(10)
and the covariance between residuals at periods t and s is
cov(e
it
e
is
) = E(
i
)
2
+E(
it

is
) = 
2

(11)
since I am assuming that  is i.i.d. Thus, the model to be estimated has
the following linear structure

ts
= 
1
+ 
2
D
ts
(12)
where D
ts
= 1 if t=s and D
ts
= 0 otherwise while 
1
= 
2

and 
2
= 
2

:
Now consider the covariance matrices shown in Table 8. With 3 years
of data, that means I have 6 distinct elements (per method of pay) that
I try to t with the two component of variance representation given
by equations (10) and (11). The covariance model given by these two
equations imposes that all diagonal elements should be equal and that
all o-diagonal elements should also be equal. This gives a total of four
restrictions to be imposed on the data. To test these restrictions, I
make use of the minimum distance estimator proposed by Chamberlain.
Succinctly, let m
i
be the column vector of the unique elements of the
3X3 cross-product matrix of residuals for workers i. Then I calculate,
for each method of pay, the sample means of the elements of m
i
, giving
us the column vector m. The model I want to estimate is a model for
10
Note that the data being unbalanced, the number of workers used to compute
the estimate is not the same for each covariance elements. To simplify the exposition
of the methodology, l assume that the data are balanced.
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m. A consistent estimator of the covariance matrix of the covariance
elements in m is given by

 =
1
N
N
X
i=1
(m
i
 m)(m
i
 m)
0
(13)
The equally weighted minimum distance estimator (EWMD) minimizes
the following quadratic form with respect to 
 = [m D]
0
[m D] (14)
where D is the design matrix made of ones and zeros while  = (
2

; 
2

)
is the vector of parameters to be estimated. On the other hand, the
optimally weighted minimum distance estimator (OMD) minimizes with
respect to  the quadratic form
 = [m D]
0


 1
[m D] (15)
Altonji and Segal (1994) discuss how small sample size can lead to a
substantial bias when using the OMD estimator in comparison to using
the identity matrix as the weighting matrix. Results are thus presented
for both estimators. Under the null hypothesis of a correct specication
in equation (12), the value of the objective function (14) (or (15)) is
distributed as a 
2
with degrees of freedom given by the number of re-
strictions (the dierence between the number of sample moments to t
(6) and the number of parameters (2). Results in Table 9 show that the
simple two component model ts the data quite well as all goodness-of-t
statistics are not surprising values coming from a 
2
(4) distribution.
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As for the estimated parameters, note that the relative contribution of
unobserved worker productivity is much larger in the case of workers
being paid a piece rate. This is consistent with the view that pay and
productivity are more closely linked for these workers than is the case
for other workers. Thus, although the simple self-selection story of work-
ers into piece rate jobs does not get much support from the data, the
prediction of Lazear's (1986) model concerning the dispersion of wages
for incentive workers is strongly supported. Note also that since con-
trolling for unobserved ability accounts for a sizeable portion of the vari-
ance, Seiler's (1984) story that piece rate workers get rewarded for facing
higher income risks is not consistent with the results reported here.
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This is not really a surprise given the low number of sample moments to t.
When the time dimension in the data set increases, similar exercises at trying to t
such a parsimonious structure (e.g. Abowd and Card (1989)) usually reject it quite
decidedly.
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5 Conclusion
There are two important caveats to the results presented in this paper.
The rst one is that we should keep in mind the limitations imposed by
the data on methods of pay contained in the NLSY. We do not have
the dollar amounts paid according to \incentive" pay. Thus, it may be
that for many workers, much of their labor income is in the form of
hourly rates or salaries supplemented with a certain amount of income
earned through pay-for-performance schemes. The second caveat is that
I have abstracted from unobserved job-match characteristics. Although
not shown here, the estimation of a within job xed-eect model proved
to be problematic in that much of the variance needed to estimate the co-
ecients was eliminated thereby blowing up the standard errors, making
all inferences rather weak concerning the eect of piece rates on earn-
ings. The main reason is that pay methods do not appear to change
much for workers during their tenure with the employer. For example,
in the case of piece rate workers, when I consider only those who stay
three years with the same employer, the simple correlation coecient
between the piece rate dummy indicator and its lagged value is 98%. It
is the cross-employer variation that allows identication of the eects.
Better data will be required to deal in a satisfactory manner with the
issue of unobserved job-match characteristics.
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Table 1
Mean Sample Statistics
Hourly Earnings ($ 1979) 7.1
Schooling 12.4
Percentage Female 43.7
Percentage Paid Piece rates 9.4
Percentage Paid Bonuses 14.1
Sample Size 8165
Number of Workers 3847
Table 2
Number of Observations by Industry and Occupation (1-digit)-NLSY Total Sample
Prof., Tech., Manag. & Sales Clerical & Craftsmen Operatives Laborers Service
& Kindred Admin. Kindred & Kindred & Kindred Workers Total Percentages
Agricuture, Forestry, 6 4 1 3 15 8 48 1 86 1.05%
& Fisheries
Mining 16 4 0 9 14 40 5 0 88 1.08%
Construction 7 34 4 27 374 98 145 1 690 8.45%
Manufacturing 219 146 60 273 374 956 120 36 2184 26.75%
Transportation,
Communications, & 66 62 17 130 105 150 49 24 603 7.39%
Other Public Utilities
Wholesale and 43 459 185 381 132 199 107 335 1841 22.55%
Retail Trade
Finance, Insurance, 41 123 88 316 7 2 8 30 615 7.53%
and Real Estate
Services 512 194 39 460 158 123 50 522 2058 25.21%
Totals 910 1026 394 1599 1179 1576 532 949 8165
Percentages 11.15% 12.57% 4.83% 19.58% 14.44% 19.30% 6.52% 11.62%
Table 3
Number of Observations by Industry and Occupation (1-digit)-NLSY Piece Rate Subsample
Prof., Tech., Manag. & Sales Clerical & Craftsmen Operatives Laborers Service
& Kindred Admin. Kindred & Kindred & Kindred Workers Total Percentages
Agricuture, Forestry, 0 0 1 0 2 1 3 0 7 0.91%
& Fisheries
Mining 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00%
Construction 1 3 1 0 21 10 6 0 42 5.48%
Manufacturing 6 15 26 3 22 153 10 1 236 30.81%
Transportation,
Communications, & 3 3 5 6 2 21 6 0 46 6.01%
Other Public Utilities
Wholesale and 7 59 72 15 27 21 9 6 216 28.20%
Retail Trade
Finance, Insurance, 2 13 34 16 0 1 1 0 67 8.75%
and Real Estate
Services 13 14 13 14 36 12 6 44 152 19.84%
Totals 32 107 152 54 110 219 41 51 766
Percentages 4.18% 13.97% 19.84% 7.05% 14.36% 28.59% 5.35% 6.66%
Table 4
Number of Observations by Industry and Occupation (1-digit)-NLSY Bonus Subsample
Prof., Tech., Manag. & Sales Clerical & Craftsmen Operatives Laborers Service
& Kindred Admin. Kindred & Kindred & Kindred Workers Total Percentages
Agricuture, Forestry, 0 0 1 0 2 1 5 0 9 0.78%
& Fisheries
Mining 3 2 0 2 1 8 0 0 16 1.39%
Construction 1 12 0 2 25 8 10 0 58 5.03%
Manufacturing 29 37 22 27 47 93 14 2 271 23.48%
Transportation,
Communications, & 15 12 6 18 12 27 6 0 96 8.32%
Other Public Utilities
Wholesale and 10 152 34 36 15 22 15 25 309 26.78%
Retail Trade
Finance, Insurance, 8 26 23 48 0 1 0 2 108 9.36%
and Real Estate
Services 69 51 15 61 19 20 5 47 287 24.87%
Totals 135 292 101 194 121 180 55 76 1154
Percentages 11.70% 25.30% 8.75% 16.81% 10.49% 15.60% 4.77% 6.59%
Table 5
Number of Observations by Industry and Occupation (1-digit)-NLSY Promotion Subsample
Prof., Tech., Manag. & Sales Clerical & Craftsmen Operatives Laborers Service
& Kindred Admin. Kindred & Kindred & Kindred Workers Total Percentages
Agricuture, Forestry, 1 0 0 0 4 1 8 0 14 1.00%
& Fisheries
Mining 2 1 0 2 0 5 2 0 12 0.85%
Construction 1 10 1 8 61 11 18 1 111 7.91%
Manufacturing 48 45 14 60 76 105 15 8 371 26.42%
Transportation,
Communications, & 12 13 2 24 17 19 8 1 96 6.84%
Other Public Utilities
Wholesale and 5 140 31 69 26 21 18 38 348 24.79%
Retail Trade
Finance, Insurance, 9 30 12 55 2 1 2 3 114 8.12%
and Real Estate
Services 92 49 9 77 24 13 9 65 338 24.07%
Totals 170 288 69 295 210 176 80 116 1404
Percentages 12.11% 20.51% 4.91% 21.01% 14.96% 12.54% 5.70% 8.26%
Table 6
Number of Observations by Industry and Occupation (1-digit)-NLSYIncrease in Responsibility Subsample
Prof., Tech., Manag. & Sales Clerical & Craftsmen Operatives Laborers Service
& Kindred Admin. Kindred & Kindred & Kindred Workers Total Percentages
Agricuture, Forestry, 1 1 0 0 5 1 10 0 18 0.79%
& Fisheries
Mining 3 2 0 3 2 6 2 0 18 0.79%
Construction 2 11 1 12 95 20 31 0 172 7.56%
Manufacturing 77 61 22 95 121 197 23 12 608 26.74%
Transportation,
Communications, & 19 19 2 46 33 28 13 4 164 7.21%
Other Public Utilities
Wholesale and 18 180 49 107 37 49 24 63 527 23.18%
Retail Trade
Finance, Insurance, 13 46 28 91 4 2 1 6 191 8.40%
and Real Estate
Services 148 61 12 147 44 27 17 120 576 25.33%
Totals 281 381 114 501 341 330 121 205 2274
Percentages 12.36% 16.75% 5.01% 22.03% 15.00% 14.51% 5.32% 9.01%
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Table 7
Earnings Function Estimates
(Dependent Variable: Log of Real Hourly Labor Income)
Specifications
1 2 3 4
Independent Variables (OLS) (Fixed-Effects) (OLS) (Fixed-Effects)
Piece Rate 0.0491 0.0469 0.0957 0.0859
(0.0171) (0.0238) (0.0248) (0.0332)
Piece Rate X Tenure — — -0.0159 -0.0141
— — (0.0061) (0.0082)
Bonus 0.0679 -0.0019 0.0607 -0.0313
(0.0141) (0.0173) (0.0213) (0.0261)
Bonus X Tenure — — 0.0003 0.0089
— — (0.0049) (0.0060)
R-Squared 0.3468 0.7988 0.3473 0.7999
Notes. Sample size: 8,165. Other covariates include the number of years of
schooling, labor market experience and its square, employer tenure and its square,
and dummies for gender, race, industry, occupation, region, health status and
increase in responsibilities.
22
Table 8
Empirical Covariance Matrices of Log Wage Residuals
(Standard Deviations in parentheses)
[Cell Size]
A. Workers Paid Salaries or Hourly Rates (# = 3390)
1988 1989 1990
1988 0.2249
(0.0269)
[2062]
1989 0.1122 0.2295
(0.0061) (0.0259)
[1374] [2235]
1990 0.1023 0.1184 0.2432
(0.0064) (0.0059) (0.0275)
[1200] [1420] [2136]
B. Workers Paid Piece Rates (# = 533)
1988 1989 1990
1988 0.2335
(0.0294)
[255]
1989 0.2287 0.3248
(0.0382) (0.0671)
[100] [248]
1990 0.2109 0.1785 0.3258
(0.0382) (0.0292) (0.0734)
[83] [107] [263]
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Table 8 - continued
Empirical Covariance Matrices of Log Wage Residuals
(Standard Deviations in parentheses)
[Cell Size]
C. Workers Paid Bonuses (# = 718)
1988 1989 1990
1988 0.1879
(0.0243)
[376]
1989 0.1144 0.2152
(0.0174) (0.0456)
[130] [391]
1990 0.1129 0.1296 0.1645
(0.0172) (0.0180) (0.0135)
[117] [137] [387]
Notes. The wage observations used to compute these covariances are adjusted for
education and experience in the labor market. The total number of workers in
Panels A, B, and C is greater than the total number of workers in the overall sample
because many workers experience different pay methods.
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Table 9
Minimum Distance Estimation of Covariance Structure
(Standard Errors in parentheses)
A. Equally Weighted Minimum Distance Estimation
Salaried and Hourly Piece Rate Bonus
Paid Workers Workers Workers
Parameter
Variance of Unobserved 0.1109 0.2061 0.1024
Worker Ability (0.0051) (0.0240) (0.0087)
Variance of i.i.d 0.1216 0.0886 0.1074
Component (0.0072) (0.0339) (0.0124)
Chi-Square Statistic 1.05 3.68 0.66
Degrees of Freedom 4 4 4
Number of Workers 3390 533 718
B. Optimally Weighted Minimum Distance Estimation
Salaried and Hourly Piece Rate Bonus
Paid Workers Workers Workers
Parameter
Variance of Unobserved 0.1116 0.1821 0.1036
Worker Ability (0.0065) (0.0392) (0.0078)
Variance of i.i.d 0.1109 0.0505 0.1029
Component (0.0206) (0.0391) (0.0189)
Chi-Square Statistic 7.15 8.22 2.38
Degrees of Freedom 4 4 4
Number of Workers 3390 533 718
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